Publications
Authors:
  • Tomi Silander , Tei Laine , Kayo Sakamoto , Ilya Farber
Citation:
ICCM, Groningen, The Netherlands, 9-11 April, 2015
Abstract:
We studied deceptive decision making in hypothetical scenarios
that involved risk of being caught of deceiving, or a penalty
after being caught of deceiving, or both. We found that the deception
rate was the lowest in the scenarios involving both the
risk and the penalty. Our hierarchical model for deception suggests
that in balancing the possible benefits from deception, the
personal discomfort of getting caught is as large or larger than
the inherent aversion to deception.
Keywords: Decision making; risk attitudes; deception; incentives;
MTurk.
Year:
2015
Report number:
2015/014
Attachments: